In distributed systems based on the quantum recursive network architecture, quantum channels are used to establish entangled quantum states between node pairs. Such systems are robust against attackers that interact with the quantum channels. Conversely, weaknesses emerge when an attacker takes full control of a node and alters the configuration of the local quantum memory, either to make a denial-of-service attack or to reprogram the node. In such a scenario, entanglement verification over quantum memories is a means for detecting the intruder. In this paper, we thoroughly analyze an entanglement verification protocol previously proposed by Nagy and Akl, denoted as NA2010. Then, we introduce two novel entanglement verification protocols and we prove that they are even more efficient in terms of intrusion detection probability versus sacrificed quantum resources. Remarkably, all these protocols require only classical channels and local quantum operations to work.
Introduction
Quantum repeater networks enable the sharing of quantum states [1] between spatially separated systems. More specifically, the quantum recursive network architecture (QRNA) introduced by Van Meter et al. [5] supports the creation of entangled quantum states between node pairs, being them directly connected by a quantum channel or separated by multiple hops. Distributed quantum states are used, e.g., in decision algorithms, distributed arithmetic, secure distributed function computation, quantum secret sharing, remote synchronization of clocks [2, 3, 4] . In a QRNA node, entangled qubits are maintained into a local quantum memory, together with non-entangled qubits that serve for storage and processing purposes. Nagy and Akl et al. [6] proposed a QRNA-based wireless sensor network (WSN), provided with a secure communicaton scheme assuming the presence of a base station that shares qubits with sensor nodes and the system's administrator, which is supposed to be the only user allowed to read sensor data. Later, Turkanovic and Holbl [7] argued that quantum cryptography is inadequate for WSNs, because of its high costs and unreliability facing denial of service attacks, node captures and topology instability. However, at least for fixed and satellite QRNA-based distributed systems, quantum cryptography promises levels of security that are impossible to achieve with classical approaches [8] . In particular, such systems are robust against attackers that interact with quantum channels.
Bennett and Brassard were the first to propose a quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme (known as BB84) [9] that uses communication over a quantum channel, in addition to the public classical authenticated channel. Conversely, quantum key distillation allows two nodes to transform shared pairs of entangled particles into a common secret key, while using only a classical authentic communication over a public channel. 1 Not involving quantum channels is particularly convenient for security proofs. The first example of quantum key distillation protocol is E91 by Ekert [3] . Any QKD protocol can be transformed into a quantum key distillation protocol [11] . Recently, Braunstein et al. [10] have shown that QKD can be realized also without quantum channels. Moreover, Vazirani and Vidick [12] have resolved the challenge of device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD), with a variant of Ekert's protocol used to generate a shared random key that is secure against a general quantum eavesdropper, while tolerating noise in the devices. DIQKD works with any quantum device, with the sole assumption of spatial separation.
In this work, we focus on a particularly challenging case of security breach in QRNA-based distributed systems, namely the one where an attacker takes full control of a node and alters the configuration of the local quantum memory, either to make a denial-of-service attack or to reprogram the node. In such a scenario, entanglement verification over quantum memories is a means for detecting the intruder.
Experimental procedures for entanglement verification have been classified by van Enk et al. [13] as follows: 1. teleportation; 2. Bell-CHSH inequality tests; 3. tomography; 4. entanglement witnesses; 5. direct measurement of entanglement; 6. consistency with entanglement. All these approaches have been studied, both analytically and experimentally, considering scenarios that are different from the one described in this paper, where we assume that the source of entanglement is trusted, but parties may be dishonest. Usually, the focus is either on untrusted sources of entangle qubits (photons, in most cases) or on eavesdroppers that interfere with the quantum channel while entangled qubits are transmitted. Pappa et al. [14] proposed an entanglement verification protocol that assumes the source is untrusted and works in the presence of dishonest parties. The protocol is simple and highly appealing, but its efficiency strongly depends on the operator U that dishonest parties apply to their portion of the shared state. The authors provide an upper bound that is strictly < 1 on the success probability of the protocol, not specifying a lower bound.
Looking for efficient entanglement verification protocols that require only classical channels and local quantum operations to work, we thoroughly analyze the one proposed by Nagy and Akl [28] , that we denote as NA2010 for simplicity. Then, we propose and analyze two entanglement verification protocols based on teleportation (denoted as AC1 and AC2), characterized by increasing efficiency. Compared to NA2010, our AC1 and AC2 protocols are much more convenient in terms of intrusion detection probability, the sacrificed quantum resources being equal. Remarkably, the success probability p of AC2 is always ≥ 1/2 and ≤ 1, for any measurement basis the intruder adopts to destroy the entanglement. If the intruder measured in the computational or diagonal basis, p = 3/4. Thus, to detect the intruder with high probability, it is necessary to sacrifice only a few qubit pairs. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we illustrate the structure and functions of the considered QRNA-based distributed systems. In Section 3, we present and discuss the attack model. In Section 4, we illustrate and compare NA2010, AC1 and AC2. In Section 5, for the sake of completeness, we explain how any two nodes can create a secure shared key to encrypt messages in classical communications. In Section 6, we discuss related work. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude the paper with an outline for future work. The notation adopted throughout the paper is clearly detailed in Appendix 1, in order to make the paper as self-contained as possible.
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QRNA-based Distributed Systems
In general, a distributed system consists of multiple autonomous nodes that are able to perform computations and communicate through a network. Nodes may be fixed or mobile.
In this paper, we consider QRNA-based distributed systems where fixed nodes, provided with universal quantum computing capabilities, are connected by optical fiber links and may be organized according to any topology and hierarchy. In Figure 1 , an example of the envisioned QRNA-based distributed systems is shown. Let us assume that all nodes have a quantum memory characterized by two types of qubits: 1. entangled qubits, used to establish secret keys, to perform quantum teleportation tasks and more; 2. worker qubits, containing programs, data and transit packets. A wide variety of systems have been proposed as quantum memories [16, 17] . A promising solid-state approach is based on the reversible mapping of optical quantum states onto the hyperfine states of rare-earth centers in doped crystals [18, 19, 20] . In particular, the XX:4
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preservation of quantum coherence on hours timescale has been achieved in Y 2 SiO 5 doped with Eu 3+ [20].
To create entangled qubit pairs between two nodes connected by a quantum channel (e.g., an optical fiber link), a widely adopted approach is to create a Bell state at one node and send one of its two qubits (e.g., a photon) over the quantum channel [21] . Spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC) in second-order nonlinear crystals has proven to be a very convenient tool to produce these photonic "flying" entangled qubits [22] . A rival technology is four-wave mixing (FWM) in third-order nonlinear media such as standard optical fibres [23] . Recently, De Greve et al. [24] have demonstrated entanglement between an InAs quantum-dot electron spin qubit and a photonic qubit, suitable for long-distance quantum communication.
Importantly, entanglement swapping [27] can be used in order to create a bipartite entangled state between two nodes, with the support of intermediate nodes. Entanglement swapping uses quantum teleportation [29] to splice two Bell pairs spanning adjacent short distances into one pair over the corresponding longer distance. Let us assume that N 1 shares a Bell pair (q 1i , q 1i ) whose state is |β 00 with node N 3, and N 2 shares another Bell pair (q 2j , q 2j ), whose state is |β 00 , with N 3, where q 1i owns to N 1, q 2j owns to N 2, and q 1i q 2j own to N 3, as shown in Figure 2 (a). If N 3 measures its two qubits in the Bell basis, then N 1 and N 2 come across one of the four Bell states:
To let N 1 and N 2 know which Bell they finally share, N 3 has to send them a couple of classical bits. Furthermore, the aforementioned approach can be extended to the situation in which N 1 and N 2 do not share entangled qubit pairs with a common neighbor, by implementing entanglement swapping over a chain of nodes, as shown in Figure 2 
Attack Model
QRNA-based distributed systems are robust against security breaches when the attacker is located in between nodes, thanks to quantum key distribution and distillation protocols. Conversely, weaknesses emerge when an attacker takes full control of a node and alters the configuration of the quantum memory, either to make a denial-of-service attack or to reprogram the node. More precisely, the following attack scenarios can be naturally assumed. 1. The attacker (Eve, from now on) is able to measure some (or all) of the qubits-either by intercepting them when they are distributed, or by gaining access the memory of some nodes.
2.
Eve is able to entangle some (or all) of the qubits with a quantum memory of her own, and measure that memory at a later point after listening in on the classical communications. 3. Eve is able to completely take over certain nodes, including the quantum memories at those nodes. This is essentially the assumption that some of the parties in the network are not trustworthy. In any case, it is assumed that the attacker can listen in on all classical communications.
Work on quantum key distribution has generally shown that 2 does not give Eve appreciably more power than 1. By contrast, 3 makes Eve much more powerful. To detect Eve when she intercepts qubits when they are sent over quantum channels, there are several known effective solutions. For example, the generalized Bell's theorem (CHSH inequalities) [25, 26] can be used, as suggested by Ekert [3] .
In this paper, we consider scenario 3, i.e., Eve physically captures the node and takes full control of its functioning. Such a node is generally called compromised, but there are two alternative scenarios:
Eve interacts with the local quantum memory, reconfiguring the states of the qubits either to make a denial-of-service attack or to reprogram the node to a behavior in accordance with her own plans; Eve does not interact with the local quantum memory, thus preserving the entangled quantum states that are shared with other nodes. In the first scenario, entanglement verification is a means for intrusion detection.
Regarding the second scenario, which is out of the scope of this paper, Eve can read incoming messages and send her own ones using secure communications. However, she cannot reprogram the node. The success of any verifier's scheme relies on Eve's weakness in making the node behave as if it was not compromised.
Entanglement Verification Protocols
In this section, we consider the problem of understanding whether one of two nodes that are supposed to share entangled qubits have been compromised, meaning that an attacker has destructed the entangled states. For example, a |β ij becomes either |00 or |11 . We illustrate three protocols for entanglement verification. The first protocol, that we denote as NA2010 for convenience, was introduced by Nagy and Akl in a previous work [28] . Our presentation of NA2010 is more rigorous with respect to the original one. The second protocol, namely AC1, is described and evaluated for the first time in this paper. The third protocol, namely AC2, merges teleportation and a centralized entanglement verification strategy proposed by Nagy and Akl [28] . All these protocols require only local quantum operations and classical communication. We show that, compared to NA2010, AC1 is much more efficient in terms of intrusion detection probability, the sacrificed quantum resources being equal. AC2 is even better than AC1, although more onerous in gate requirements.
NA2010 Protocol
Suppose that two nodes share n entangled qubit pairs whose assumed state is |β ij , with i, j ∈ {0, 1}. One of the two nodes, called the Verifier, wants to check if the Other Party has been compromised. Thus, the following procedure (graphically illustrated in Figures 3 and  4 ) is repeated m < n times. 1. The Verifier selects a previously unchecked qubit pair and a random value x ∈ {0, 1}. 2. If x = 0, the Verifier measures its qubit of the selected qubit pair. If x = 1, the Verifier applies the Hadamard operator H to its qubit of the selected qubit pair, then measures the qubit in the computational basis. 3. Using a public and authenticated classical channel, the Verifier sends a message to the Other Party, specifying which qubit pair is being checked (by means of an identifier). 4. The Other Party selects a random value y ∈ {0, 1}. 5. If y = 0, the Other Party measures its qubit of the selected qubit pair. If y = 1, the Other Party applies the Hadamard operator to its qubit of the selected qubit pair, then measures the qubit. 6. Using a public and authenticated classical channel, the Other Party sends the measured value b and y to the Verifier. 7. The Verifier produces a classical bit v = 1 if one of the following conditions hold:
In any other case, the Verifier produces v = 0. 8. The Verifier concludes that the Other Party has been compromised if and only if v = 1, ∀i, j. In any other case, the Verifier cannot decide. The output is v.
Correctness Proof -Since x and y are random and independent, it follows that they are equal in 50% of the cases. If x = y = 0, the qubit pair is measured. If the assumed state was one of |β 00 and |β 11 , obtaining a = b means that the qubit pair was not entangled. It is worth noting that if the ensemble was actually not entangled, measuring the two qubits reveals the issue in 25% of the cases, not always. The same reasoning applies to the other cases listed at step 7. If x = y, for any i, j in |β ij , the ensemble state is turned to a superposition of the four terms |ij , with i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, a and b does not allow the Verifier to decide whether the ensemble state was entangled or not. Security Analysis -We have to consider two cases. First, if the Other Party is not an attacker, it is expected that its behavior is fair, i.e., it does respect the protocol. Second, if the Other Party is an attacker, it could, in theory, send random b and y values to the Verifier. However, this would not affect the chances of being detected by the Verifier (as the Other Party does not know x).
Overall, for each run of the procedure, the probability to detect a non-entangled pair is 1/8. Thus, an attacker succeeds with probability 7/8. If the procedure is executed m times, the attacker succeeds with probability random number generation (twice); qubit measurement (twice); application of the H gate (never, once or twice); classical bit dispatching (k by the Verifier, where k is the size of the identifier that specifies which qubit pair is being checked; 2 by the Other Party); binary variable check (5 by the Verifier; k + 1 by the Other Party). Only basic single-qubit quantum gates are used. The circuit topology is specific for NA2010.
By checking m = 10 qubit pairs with NA2010, the attacker is caught with probability p m = 1 − (7/8) 10 = 0.73. With m = 20, the probability is p m = 0.93. To get p m = 0.99, it is necessary to check m = 35 qubits.
AC1 Protocol
Suppose that two nodes share n entangled qubit pairs whose assumed state is |β ij , with i, j ∈ {0, 1}. One of the two nodes, called the Verifier, wants to check if the Other Party has been compromised. Thus, the following procedure (graphically illustrated in Figures 5 and  6 ) is repeated m < n times. 1. Using a public and authenticated classical channel, the Verifier sends a classical message to the Other Party, for starting a quantum teleportation process [29] where a qubit in the state |ψ has to be transferred from the Other Party to the Verifier. The message contains the identifier of the entangled qubit pair to be used in the quantum teleportation process, plus one bit s (selector) to specify whether |ψ = |0 (when s = 0) or |ψ = (|0 + |1 )/ √ 2 (when s = 1) (with uniform probability). 2. The Other Party prepares a qubit in the state |ψ and performs the operations required by the quantum teleportation protocol, finally sending two classical bits b 1 and b 2 to the Verifier, over a public and authenticated classical channel. 3. The Verifier applies U to its half of the qubit pair that is supposed to be entangled, where On the other hand, if the Other Party has been compromised, the Verifier has the possibility to get either |0 or |1 out of U . This happens with 1/2 probability, when s = 1 and the Other Party broke the entanglement by measuring in the standard basis; s = 0 and the Other Party broke the entanglement by measuring in the diagonal basis. Thus, by applying H s to |ψ , the Verifier obtains either (|0 + |1 )/ √ 2 or (|0 − |1 )/ √ 2. In both cases, there is a 1/2 probability to measure v = 1, which would reveal that the Other Party has been compromised.
The probability to detect the attacker remains > 0 for any possible choice of the measurement basis by the attacker. Assuming that the Verifier gets |ψ = α|0 + β|1 , with α, β ∈ C such that |α| 2 + |β| 2 = 1, then if s = 0, then H s |ψ = |ψ and p = |β| 2 ;
if s = 1, then H s |ψ = (α+β)|0 −(α−β)|1 √ 2
and p = |α−β| 2
2
. Thus, considering that s = 0 and s = 1 have the same probability, it is To characterize p statistically, we generated 10 6 random combinations of α and β and we observed the frequency distribution f (p) illustrated in Figure 7 . The domain of f (p) is [0.146, 0.854]. Interestingly, f (p) has one peak in p = 1/4, which is the value obtained considering an attacker that performs measurements either in the standard or diagonal basis. Last but not least, the mean value of p is 0.41 > 1/4. Security Analysis -We have to consider two cases. First, if the Other Party is not an attacker, it is expected that its behavior is fair, i.e., it does respect the protocol. Second, if the Other Party is an attacker, it could, in theory, send random b 1 and b 2 to the Verifier. However, this would not affect the chances of being detected by the Verifier.
For instance, if the attacker performs measurements either in the standard or diagonal basis, the probability to detect a non-entangled pair is 1/4, for each run of the procedure. Thus, the attacker succeeds with probability 3/4. If the procedure is executed m times, the attacker succeeds with probability (3/4) m . Thus, AC1 succeeds in detecting the attacker with probability p m = 1 − (3/4) m . Cost Analysis -AC1 consists of m repetitions of the following operations:
classical bit dispatching (k + 1 by the Verifier, where k is the size of the identifier that specifies which qubit pair is being checked, and 1 is for s; 2 by the Other Party); preparation of a qubit with state |ψ (once by the Other Party) application of the CNOT gate (once by the Other Party); application of the H gate (once by the Other Party, never or once by the Verifier depending on s); qubit measurement (once by the Verifier, twice by the Other Party); application of the X gate (never or once, by the Verifier); application of the Z gate (never or once, by the Verifier); binary variable check (3 by the Verifier; k + 1 by the Other Party). Considering that teleportation subsystems are always included in QRNA nodes (e.g., to support entanglement swapping), the only part of the quantum circuit that is specific for AC1 is the one that includes the H gate and the measurement gate at the Verifier (yellow-colored in Figure 6 ). The total amount of dispatched classical bits is k + 3, one more than NA2010.
AC1 is more efficient than NA2010, considering the number of sacrificed entangled qubit pairs. By checking m = 5 qubit pairs with AC1, the attacker is caught with probability p m = 1 − (3/4) 5 = 0.7626. With m = 10, the probability is p m = 0.9436. To get p m = 0.99, it is necessary to check m = 17 qubit pairs -with respect to NA2010, 50% less qubit pairs are sacrificed.
AC2 Protocol
Suppose that two nodes share n entangled qubit pairs whose assumed state is |β ij , with i, j ∈ {0, 1}. One of the two nodes, called the Verifier, wants to check if the Other Party has been compromised. Thus, the following procedure (graphically illustrated in Figures 8 and  9 ) is repeated m < n times. 1. Using a public and authenticated classical channel, the Verifier sends a classical message to the Other Party, for starting a quantum teleportation process to transfer the q 2 half of an entangled qubit pair (q 1 , q 2 ) from the Other Party to the Verifier, which already owns q 1 . The message contains the identifier of the entangled qubit pair enabling the quantum teleportation process, as well as the identifier of the entangled qubit pair (q 1 , q 2 ) to be checked. 2. The Other Party performs the operations required by the quantum teleportation protocol, finally sending two classical bits b 1 and b 2 to the Verifier, over a public and authenticated classical channel. 3. The Verifier applies U to its half of the |β ij qubit pair enabling the quantum teleportation process, where
Once both qubits of the qubit pair (q 1 , q 2 ) to be checked for entanglement are local to the Verifier, a CNOT is applied using q 1 as controller, followed by a H gate to q 1 , followed by another CNOT still using q 1 as controller. Finally, the Verifier measures both qubits, thus obtaining two classical bits v 1 and v 2 .
The Verifier concludes that the Other Party has been compromised if and only if
the state of the checked qubit pair was supposed to be |β 00 , and v 1 = v 2 or v 1 v 2 = 11; the state of the checked qubit pair was supposed to be |β 01 , and v 1 = v 2 or v 1 v 2 = 10; the state of the checked qubit pair was supposed to be |β 10 , and v 1 = v 2 or v 1 v 2 = 01; the state of the checked qubit pair was supposed to be |β 11 , and v 1 = v 2 or v 1 v 2 = 00. In any other case, the Verifier cannot decide. The output is the (v 1 , v 2 ) couple.
Correctness Proof -Independently of i, j, if the Other Party has not been compromised, the checked qubit pair results at the Verifier, after U has been applied to the Verifier's half of |β ij . The effect of the quantum circuit at the Verifier is to turn the Bell basis {|β 00 , |β 01 , |β 10 , |β 11 } into the standard computational basis {|00 , |01 , |10 , |11 }. Thus, if the Other Party has not been compromised, a checked |β 00 always yields v 1 = v 2 = 0 and a checked |β 11 always yields v 1 = v 2 = 1. Similarly, checking either |β 01 or |β 10 always
On the other hand, if the Other Party has been compromised, both the teleportation process and the checked qubit pair are affected. Initially, we consider the case of an attacker measuring either in the computational or diagonal basis (below we analyze the general case). The state of a broken-entenglement qubit pair is then one of {|00 , |01 , |10 , |11 } or one of {H|0 H|0 , H|0 H|1 , H|1 H|0 , H|1 H|1 }, depending on the original entanglement and on the basis used by the attacker to perform the measure. Consider the following scenario. The qubit pair to be checked is supposed to be in the |β 00 state. Let us assume that its actual state is |00 . The qubit pair indicated by the Verifier for being used in the teleportation process is supposed to be in the |β 00 state, but actually it may be in the |00 , |11 , H|0 H|0 or H|1 H|1 state, with equal probability. As a consequence: Figure 9 Block diagram of the system implementing AC2, in case the qubit pair to be checked and the one to be used for the quantum teleporation are both supposed to be in the state |βij = |β00 . Only the yellow blocks are specific for AC2. The other blocks represent the subsystem that implements the teleportation algorithm [29].
1. if the qubit pair sacrificed for the teleportation is in the |00 state, then the Verifier receives |0 and applies the quantum circuit to |00 , thus obtaining |β 00 and finally measuring v 1 = v 2 = 0 with 1/2 probability; 2. if the qubit pair sacrificed for the teleportation is in the |11 state, then the Verifier receives |1 and applies the quantum circuit to |01 , thus obtaining |β 01 and finally measuring v 1 = v 2 = 0 with 0 probability; 3. if the qubit pair sacrificed for the teleportation is in the H|0 H|0 state, then the Verifier receives (|0 + |1 )/ √ 2 and applies the quantum circuit to |0 (|0 + |1 )/ √ 2, thus obtaining (|00 + |01 + |10 + |11 )/2 and finally measuring v 1 = v 2 = 0 with 1/4 probability; 4. if the qubit pair sacrificed for the teleportation is in the H|1 H|1 state, then the Verifier receives (|0 −|1 )/ √ 2 and applies the quantum circuit to |0 (|0 −|1 )/ √ 2, thus obtaining (|00 − |01 − |10 + |11 )/2 and finally measuring v 1 = v 2 = 0 with 1/4 probability. Thus, the overall probability to reveal that the Other Party has been compromised is p = 1 4
(
The same beautiful result is obtained if the qubit pair to be checked, instead of being in the |β 00 state, is in the |11 ,
2 state, and in general for any supposed |β ij state of the qubit pair to be checked and of the qubit pair to be used for the teleportation.
The probability to detect the attacker remains > 0 for any possible choice of the measurement basis by the attacker. Let us assume that the two qubits owned by the Verifier, after the teleportation, are:
α|0 + β|1 , with α, β ∈ C such that |α| 2 + |β| 2 = 1, on the bottom line of the scheme illustrated in Figure 9 ; γ|0 + δ|1 , with γ, δ ∈ C such that |γ| 2 + |δ| 2 = 1, as the result of the teleportation process.
Then, the verification circuit (CNOT + H + CNOT) produces the following state:
The probability to detect the attacker is
To characterize p statistically, we generated 10 6 random combinations of α, β, γ and δ and we observed the frequency distribution f (p) illustrated in Figure 10 . The domain of f (p) is [0.5, 1.0]. Interestingly, f (p) is monotonic with mean value 0.86, which is larger than 3/4, which is the p value we obtained in Section 4, considering an attacker that performs measurements either in the standard or diagonal basis. Security Analysis -We have to consider two cases. First, if the Other Party is not an attacker, it is expected to behave fairly, i.e., to respect the protocol. Second, if the Other Party is an attacker, it could, in theory, send random b 1 and b 2 to the Verifier. However, this would not affect the chances of being detected by the Verifier.
For example, if the attacker performs measurements either in the standard or diagonal basis, the probability to detect a non-entangled ensemble states is 3/4, for each run of the procedure. Thus, the attacker succeeds with probability 1/4. If the procedure is executed m times, the attacker succeeds with probability (1/4) m . Thus, AC2 succeeds in detecting the attacker with probability p m = 1 − (1/4) m . Cost Analysis -AC2 consists of m repetitions of the following operations: classical bit dispatching (2k bits by the Verifier, namely k bits specifying the identifier of the qubit pair to be used for the teleportation, and k bits specifying the identifier of the qubit pair to be checked; 2 by the Other Party); application of the CNOT gate (once by the Other Party, twice by the Verifier); application of the H gate (once by the Other Party, once by the Verifier); qubit measurement (twice by the Verifier, twice by the Other Party); application of the X gate (never or once, by the Verifier); application of the Z gate (never or once, by the Verifier); binary variable check (2 by the Verifier, 2k by the Other Party). Considering that teleportation subsystems are always included in QRNA nodes (e.g., to support entanglement swapping), the only part of the quantum circuit that is specific for AC2 is the one that includes the two CNOT gates, the H gate and the two measurement gates at the Verifier (yellow-colored in Figure 9 ). The total amount of dispatched classical bits is 2k + 2, i.e., k − 1 more than AC1 and k more than NA2010.
AC2 is much more efficient than AC1, considering the number of sacrificed entangled qubit pairs. By sacrificing 2m = 2 qubit pairs with AC2, the attacker is caught with probability p m = 1 − (1/4) m = 3/4. With the same amount of sacrificed qubits, AC1 allows the Verifier to catch the attacker with probability p m = 1 − (3/4) 2 = 0.43. To get p m = 0.99 with AC2, it is necessary to sacrifice 2m = 8 qubit pairs. With respect to NA2010, 77% less qubit pairs are sacrificed. With respect to AC1, 53% less qubit pairs are sacrificed.
In Figure 11 , the probabilities of detecting an attacker with the three protocols are compared, with respect to the number of sacrificed qubit pairs.
Securing Classical Communication Between Nodes
The communication between two nodes is secret (private), if an unauthorized user cannot read and understand the message. In this section, for the sake of completeness, we describe how any two nodes N 1 and N 2 (rather than only the network administrator and one node, as in the approach suggested by Nagy et al. [6] ) can communicate privately over classical channels, in the envisioned QRNA-based distributed systems. Probability of catching an attacker, with respect to the number of sacrificed qubit pairs, in NA2010, AC1 and AC2. It is worth noting that AC2 requires an even number of entangled qubit pairs to be sacrificed.
Suppose that nodes N 1 and N 2 share n entangled qubit pairs whose assumed state is |β ij , with i, j ∈ {0, 1}, and perform the entanglement test described in Section 4, over m < n of those qubit pairs. If the test is successfully passed, the following procedure is executed. 1. N 1 measures its k = n − m qubits with respect to the rectilinear basis and, if i = j, complement them. 2. N 2 measures its k = n − m qubits with respect to the rectilinear basis. 3. At this stage, N 1 and N 2 share a pair of k-bit raw keys, which are usually still weakly correlated, as the physical implementation is not perfect and errors may occur for many reasons other than intrusions, such as imperfect generation of quantum states or imperfect detectors, and partially secure, because of the use of public classical channels. 4. N 1 and N 2 proceed with a parameter estimation step, in which they compare some small randomly chosen set of bits of their raw key in order to get a guess for the bit error rate, i.e., the fraction of errors. 5. The remaining parts of the raw keys are now used to compute a pair of identical strings of length l, by means of information reconciliation (to correct errors) and privacy amplification (to secure the strings at the cost of a reduced key length) [32] . The resulting pair of identical strings represent the shared key that N 1 and N 2 will use to encrypt and decrypt messages.
Cascade [33] is probably the most widely used and best known protocol for information reconciliation. In a recent work, Martinez-Mateo et al. [34] proposed a number of guidelines and near optimal parameters for its practical implementation, improving performance significantly in comparison with all previous proposals. More precisely, considering a string length l = 10 4 , Martinez-Mateo et al. showed that Cascade can be optimized so that the average reconciliation efficiency f EC (whose ideal value is 1) can stay between 1.05 and 1.08, versus increasing in [0.01, 0.1], with frame error rate (i.e., the probability that after reconciliation the strings belonging to both parties differ by at least one bit) kept almost constant and close to 10 −4 , and slightly increased communication cost (i.e., the number of exchanged messages). With the same string length, the original Cascade shows a f EC between 1.14 and 1.24, versus increasing in [0.01, 0.1].
Despite extensive studies, the design of efficient privacy amplification protocols is an open problem. The main reason is that there are several optimization goals, namely: maximizing l, minimizing the number of communication rounds, maintaining security even after the secret key is used (this is called post-application robustness), and ensuring that the protocol does not leak some useful information about the raw key (this is denoted as source privacy) [35] . Most privacy amplification protocols are based on hashing. Renner showed that the string computed as the output of a hash function is secure under the sole condition than its length is smaller than the adversary's uncertainty on the input, measured in terms of smooth min-entropy, which is a generalization of the von Neumann entropy introduced by Renner itself [11] . The hash function must be chosen at random from a two-universal family of functions, i.e., a family of functions from X to Z such that P {f (x) = f (x )} ≤ 1 |Z| , for any distinct x, x ∈ X and f chosen at random from F. In such a framework, highly efficient privacy amplification protocols have been recently proposed by Aggarwal et al. [35] . In particular, the authors introduced a 4-round source-private protocol with optimal l with respect to the desired security of the protocol ε = 2 −λ (i.e., with optimal entropy loss L = O(λ)).
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Related Work
Efforts to protect information flowing through quantum networks have so far focused on environmental disturbances (decoherence, noise) and cryptographic attacks. Fault-tolerant quantum computation and quantum error-correction have been developed to overcome the former problems [36, 37, 39] . Instead, security issues have been addressed by means of quantum key distribution and distillation mechanisms, mostly. A rather clear presentation of these techniques has been proposed by Renner, in his Ph.D. Thesis [11] -a research work that is widely known for the introduction of the smooth min-entropy, which is the appropriate measure of secrecy for the establishment of a universally composable secret key. In general, entanglement plays a key role in quantum computation and communication protocols. As a consequence, many theoretical and experimental procedures for entanglement detection have been proposed (good surveys are [13, 40, 41] ) and their improvement remains an active area of research. Blume-Kohout et al.
[42] illustrated a reliable method to quantify exactly what can be concluded from finite data sets resulting from measurements in entanglement verification protocols. The authors makes no assumption on the causes of non-entanglement. The proposed method is demonstrated using two simulated experiments on two-qubit systems, the first measuring just one observable (an entanglement witness), the second performing a tomographically complete measurement. Christandl and Renner [43] showed that quantum state tomography, together with an appropriate data analysis procedure, allows one to obtain confidence regions, i.e., subsets of the state space in which the true state lies with high probability. The proposed approach can be applied to arbitrary measurements including fully coherent ones, as shown by Arrazola et al. [44] .
Most protocols refer to the scenario in which entangled qubits are photon pairs, as it is the most simple to implement experimentally. Usually, there are two parties that do not trust each other and may (or may not) trust the source of entangled photon pairs. Bennett et al. [45] proposed a loss-tolerant EPR-steering protocol that allows one party (Bob) to verify entanglement when the (untrusted) other party (Alice) is also the source of entangled photon pairs. Moroder et al. [46] presented a framework for device-independent quantification of bi-and multipartite entanglement, meaning that the amount of entanglement is measured based on the observed classical data only but independent of any quantum description of the employed devices. In their problem formulation, the authors do not consider the possibility that involved parties may be dishonest. Cavalcanti et al. [47] considered another scenario, where two untrusted parties (Alice and Bob) try to convince a referee (Charlie) that they share an entangled resource, by demonstrating a physical effect that could never achieved otherwise. More interestingly, Lyons and Walck [48] proposed a framework for a verification test protocol for certain types of families of states, namely, families characterized by stabilizing subgroups of the local unitary group (i.e., the group of one-qubit operations on n-qubit states).
Wu and Lidar [49] proposed a simple scheme to protect quantum memories against a wide class of quantum malware, i.e., a quantum logic gate, or even as a whole quantum algorithm designed with the purpose of doing harm to a quantum node. However, as the authors observed, if attacker and defender have exactly the same capabilities (including knowledge, e.g., of secret keys), the proposed defense scheme fails.
The SECOQC project (http://www.secoqc.net) culminated by the demonstration of information-theoretically secure key distribution over a fiber-based telecom metropolitan area network in Vienna, Austria, in october 2008 [31] . Later, the Tokyo QKD project (http: //www.uqcc.org/QKDnetwork/) developed a mesh-type network integrating six different QKD systems and demonstrated the world-first secure TV conferencing over a distance of 45 km [50] .
More recently, Xu et al.
[51] proposed a novel multiparty quantum key management (QKM) protocol. Firstly, the secret key is randomly generated by managers via the quantum measurements in d-level Bell basis. Then, through entanglement swapping, the secret key is successfully distributed to users. All managers can cooperate to recover the users' secret key, but neither of them can recover it unilaterally. Despite the protocol is further generalized into the multi-manager and multi-user QKM scenario, it does not enable fully decentralized quantum security.
Conclusions
In QRNA-based distributed systems, entanglement verification is a means for detecting attackers that take full control of a node and read its quantum memory. It is possible to perform entanglement verification by means of classical communication and local quantum operations only. To this purpose, we have presented two efficient protocols. Regarding future work, we plan to extend our framework in order to include Quantum Secret Sharing (QSS) [37, 52, 53] , where a secret quantum state is divided into n shares such that any k of those shares can be used to reconstruct the secret, but any set of k − 1 or fewer shares contains absolutely no information about the secret. Moreover, we will study the possibility to include quantum-assisted approaches for the generation of classical but quantum-resistant digital signatures [54]. Last but not least, we are hopeful that our research work will further motivate the implementation of physical QRNA-based distributed systems.
Appendix 1 -Notation
A qubit [15] is a quantum-mechanical system defined in C 2 . Thus, its state can be the superposition of two orthonormal states at the same time. Using the rectilinear basis |0 = 1 0 |1 = 0 1
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the state of a generic qubit is:
where α, β ∈ C are called probability amplitudes (with |α| 2 + |β| 2 = 1). If a qubit results to be in superposition of the two basis states, with unknown probability amplitudes, there is no way to know the values of α and β with a single measurement. When we measure a qubit, we get either the result 0, with probability |α| 2 , or the result 1, with probability |β| 2 . In the first case, the post-measurement state of the qubit is |0 . In the second case, it is |1 .
Alternatively, one can use the diagonal basis
to represent any qubit state as a linear combination of such a basis:
Measuring with respect to the |+ , |− basis results in + with probability |α + β| 2 /2 and − with probability |α − β| 2 /2, with corresponding post-measurement states |+ and |− , respectively. The Hadamard operator H = 1 √ 2 1 1 1 −1 maps |0 to |+ and |1 to |− . In the quantum teleportation algorithm [29], which plays a major role in QRNA-based distributed systems, the Pauli-X operator X = 0 1 1 0 and the Pauli-Z operator Z = 1 0 0 −1 are used. A two qubit system has four computational basis states: |00 , |01 , |10 and |11 . Its general state is |ψ = α 00 |00 + α 01 |01 + α 10 |10 + α 11 |11
The measurement result x = (00, 01, 10 or 11) occurs with probability |α x | 2 , with the state of the qubits after the measurement being |x . The normalization condition is:
If we measure the first qubit, we get 0 with probability |α 00 | 2 + |α 01 | 2 , leaving the system in the state |ψ = α 00 |00 + α 01 |01 |α 00 | 2 + |α 01 | 2
where 1/ √ ... is called re-normalization factor.
It is possible to generalize to a n qubit quantum register. Sometimes it is not possible to decompose the state of an n qubit quantum register in the tensor product of the component states. Such states are known as entangled states. Their measurement outcomes are correlated. A prominent example is the one of Bell states (or EPR states, or EPR pairs):
If we measure the first qubit, in |β 00 we obtain either state |0 or state |1 . Result 0 leaves the post-measurement state |00 , while result 1 leaves |11 . Thus, a measurement of the second qubit always gives the same result as the measurement of the first qubit. The same reasoning applies to the other Bell states.
